




Peaceable Re-entry and Relief from Forfeiture for Non-payment of Rent 
 
Pineport Ltd v Grangeglen Ltd [2016] EWHC 1318 (Ch) 
 
In this case, a tenant was granted relief from forfeiture of an underlease for non-payment of 
rent following a peaceable re-entry of an industrial unit. This was despite a delay of 14 months 
in bringing the claim for relief and the claimant’s illegality relating to its use of the premises.  
The court held that the application had still be made with reasonable promptitude given the 
special circumstances of the case. 
 
Introduction 
The provisions of ss.210-212 of the Common Law Procedure Act 1852 govern applications for 
relief against forfeiture for non-payment of rent where the landlord is enforcing his right of 
forfeiture by action through the courts. Under s.212, the tenant is entitled to be relieved in 
equity if at least six months’ rent is in arrears and, at any time before the trial of the landlord’s 
action, he pays or tenders all the arrears in full (with interest) and costs to the landlord or into 
court. Readiness, therefore, to pay the arrears and costs (on an indemnity basis) within the time 
specified by the court is normally a pre-condition of a tenant’s claim for relief. This is because 
the landlord is entitled to be put into the position he would have been if the forfeiture had not 
occurred (Innterpreneur Pub Co (CPC) Ltd v Langton [2000] 1 E.G.L.R. 34) which accords 
with the more general principle that the proviso for re-entry in the lease is merely a security for 
the rent: Ladup Ltd v Williams and Glynn’s Bank plc [1985] 1 W.L.R. 815, at 860, per Warner 
J. As a starting point, therefore, the court leans heavily in favour of granting relief provided 
that it is satisfied, with a sufficient degree of certainty, that the rent will, in fact, be paid. 
The statutory provisions contained in the 1852 Act have no application, however, where the 
landlord proceeds to forfeit the lease for non-payment of rent by actually physically re-entering 
the demised property without recourse to legal proceedings.  Here, the tenant is entitled to rely 
upon equitable relief  without any fixed time limit, although by analogy with s.210 of the 1852 
Act, a time-span of six months is used by the court as a guide in the exercise of its equitable 
jurisdiction: see, Howard v Fanshawe [1895] 2 Ch. 581 and Lovelock v Margo [1963] 2 Q.B. 
787.  
The leading case is Thatcher v C.H. Pearce & Sons (Contractors) Ltd [1968] 1 W.L.R. 748, 
where the landlords peaceably re-entered the demised property for non-payment of rent. The 
tenant applied for relief, but the landlords argued that his application was out of time, not 
having been issued within six months, as required by s.210 of the 185 Act. Sir Jocelyn Simon 
P. held that, since the landlord’s had re-entered peaceably without court proceedings, the 
court’s power to grant relief from forfeiture was not statutory but arose from its inherent 
equitable jurisdiction to which no statutory rules of limitation applied.  In his Lordship’s words: 
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“. . . a court of equity . . . would look at the situation of the plaintiff to see whether in 
all the circumstances he acted with reasonable promptitude. Naturally, it would also 
look at the situation of the defendants to see if anything has happened, particularly by 
way of delay on the part of the plaintiff which would cause a greater hardship to them 
by the extension of the relief sought than by its denial to the plaintiff.” 
This approach has been adopted in more recent case law, notably, by the Court of Appeal in 
Billson v Residential Apartments [1992] 3 W.L.R. 264, where Nicholls L.J. observed that “the 
concurrent equitable jurisdiction can only be invoked by those who apply with reasonable 
promptitude [and] what is reasonable will depend on all the circumstances, having due regard 
to the statutory time limits.” 
 
Facts in Pineport 
The tenant company held an underlease, dated 20 July 1981, of Unit 4, Endsleigh Industrial 
Estate, Southall, Middlesex, which was used as an MOT garage and workshop, for a term of 
125 years less 10 days for a premium of £90,000. The rent payable comprised three elements: 
(1) a ground rent of £100 per year; (2) a sum equivalent to the amount spent by the landlord in 
insuring the unit; and (3) a service charge which reflected the landlord’s expenditure in 
managing the estate, as well as the costs of collection and audit and the creation of a reserve. 
Clause 6(1) of the underlease included a right of re-entry in the event of non-payment of rent 
for a period of 21 days, whether formally demanded or not. 
In April 2014, the landlord forfeited the underlease by peaceable re-entry based on unpaid rent 
comprising service charges amounting to £2,155. The tenant’s claim, however, seeking relief 
against forfeiture, was not issued until June 2015, some 14 months later.  In view of this delay, 
the landlord contended that the claim should be disallowed, especially as no good reason for 
the delay had been given. Moreover, the landlord relied on the fact that the claimant had used 
the premises for an illegal activity. In this connection, one of its directors had been convicted 
of various offences relating to the issue of MOT certificates without the correct procedure being 
followed.  Over 1,400 such certificates had been issued, in some cases without the vehicle 
being examined and, in other cases, following examination by a person who was not authorised. 
The director was, at the time of the hearing, serving a sentence of 18 months imprisonment. 
 
Ruling 
The claim for relief was heard by Chief Master Marsh. On his calculations, the claimant was 
indebted to the landlord for the sum of £24,530 at the date of the hearing, comprising insurance, 
business rates, legal expenses, ground rent and service charges with interest thereon at 1 per 
cent over the base rate during the period since re-entry onto the premises. Despite this large 
amount of indebtedness, there was a likelihood that the money would be available within 12-
16 weeks since the director’s brother had offered to sell his flat and lend the claimant sufficient 
money to discharge the debt.  The flat was already on the market with a willing buyer with the 
possibility of sale taking place within a matter of weeks. In the Master’s view, that was 
sufficiently soon to fall within the “immediately foreseeable future” test indicated by Arden J. 
in Inntrepeneur, mentioned earlier. 
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So far as the illegality was concerned which led to one of the director’s conviction and sentence 
of imprisonment, it was apparent that the offences were well over the custody threshold and 
merited a moderately sever sentence. Moreover, the conduct involved activity which was 
directly connected with the claimant’s business carried on at the premises. In the Master’s view, 
however, this did not justify refusal of relief. There was no risk here of the court “appearing to 
be complicit in the continued use of the premises for unlawful or illegal activity by granting 
relief in the knowledge that that such conduct was likely to continue”: at [61].  The claimant 
had already lost its licence to grant MOT certificates and there was nothing to suggest that the 
premises had been tainted by the past illegality.  
There were also other considerations which favoured the grant of relief. First, the underlease 
had been granted for substantial premium (£90,000) at a ground rent of £100. According to the 
Master, this was an important factor which weighed heavily in the balance. In his words, at 
[62]: 
“The court should have regard to the value of the asset which the defendant will obtain 
if relief is refused compared with the rent outstanding at the date of forfeiture and the 
sum payable as a condition as the grant of relief.”  
In the present case, the rent unpaid at the time of forfeiture was £2,155 (i.e., less than 1 per cent 
of the capital value of the underlease of £275,000) and, if relief was granted, the sum payable 
(£24,530) would be about 10 per cent of its value. This, on any view, would produce a “severe 
disproportion, if relief was refused, between the value obtained by the defendant as a windfall 
and the sum due to him: ibid, at [62].  Secondly, there was no evidence of any likely prejudice 
to the defendant (or a third party) if relief was to be granted. In particular, the defendant had 
taken no steps to market the premises: ibid, at [63]. Thirdly, the lengthy period of delay 
(although a matter of “great difficulty for the claimant”) was not an insurmountable obstacle.  
The test to be applied, as mentioned earlier, was whether the application had been made with 
reasonable promptitude taking a six month period only as a guide. In the instant case, there 
were good reasons for the delay including ill health (the claimant’s director was suffering from 
depression), lack of money and the absence of specialist advice. On this point, the Master 
stated, at [64]: 
“Reasonable promptitude is an elastic concept which is capable of taking into account 
human factors . . . Although 14 months is more than double the guide period of six 
months (and near to the breaking point for the concept’s elasticity), I am satisfied that 
it would be wrong to bar the claimant from obtaining relief in the circumstances of this 
case.” 
Accordingly. The Master made an order granting the claimant relief from forfeiture on terms 
that it paid the defendant the sum of £24,530 within a period to be determined at a later hearing. 
 
Commentary 
Apart from the issue of delay, the case raises the interesting question as to whether a tenant’s 
illegal activities relating to the use of the premises can be taken into account in the exercise of 
the court’s equitable jurisdiction whether or not to grant relief from forfeiture. 
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Generally speaking, it is not legitimate to consider other breaches of covenant committed by 
the tenant. Save in very exceptional circumstances, the court is bound to exercise its discretion 
by granting relief (upon payment of all the rent with interest and costs) without regard to any 
other matters of complaint that the landlord may have against the tenant. In Gill v Lewis [1956] 
2 Q.B. 1, a case decided under s.212 of the 1852 Act and referred to by the Master in the course 
of his judgment, Jenkins L.J. said, at p. 13: 
“The question is whether, provided all is paid up, the landlord will not have been fully 
compensated; and the view taken by the court is that if he gets the whole of his rent and 
costs, then he has got all he is entitled to so far as rent is concerned, and extraneous 
matters of breach of covenant, and so forth, are, generally speaking, irrelevant.” 
In the course of his judgment, at p. 14, his Lordship alluded to an immoral user of the premises 
as constituting an exceptional circumstance disqualifying the tenant from seeking equitable 
relief. In Gill itself, evidence (1) that the landlords had experienced difficulties in extracting 
rent from the tenants in the past; (2) that they had experienced difficulties in finding the tenants 
for the purpose of bringing proceedings against them to recover the arrears of rent; and (3) one 
of the tenants had been convicted of two acts of indecent assault against two boys on the 
premises, was considered insufficient to warrant a denial of relief.  In relation to (3), the acts 
of indecency involved one isolated incident and not a continuous course of conduct. By 
contrast, in Tyfonos v D. Landau & Son Ltd (1961) 181 E.G. 405, Stevenson J. held that there 
were exceptional circumstances which entitled him to refuse relief in that one of the joint 
tenants was serving a prison sentence for arson, both tenants were insolvent, there were grave 
breaches of the covenant to repair and the landlords were well advanced in negotiations to 
dispose of the premises elsewhere: see also, Church Commissioners for England and Wales v 
Nodjoumi (1986) 51 P. & C.R. 155, at 160-161, (tenant convicted of conspiring to defraud the 
Iranian Government). In the light of these authorities, it is, perhaps, not surprising that the 
Master in Pineport decided not to treat the illegality as a bar to relief. On this point, he noted, 
at [24]: 
“It seems to me that a significant factor for the court in deciding whether there are 
exceptional circumstances is whether the grant of relief may have the effect of assisting 
the tenant to continue a breach of covenant. If the breach is past and unlikely to 
continue, even a serious breach may not be sufficient to permit the court to decline to 
grant relief.” 
The Master did, however, enter an important caveat that, in some circumstances, a landlord 
may be able to persuade the court to refuse relief if there was evidence that his reversionary 
interest had been damaged by an historic breach of covenant: ibid, at [24]. 
One other aspect of the case calls for comment. Although there was no evidence of any 
prejudice to the defendant as a result of the delay in making the application for relief (because 
the defendant had not sought to market the premises), it is apparent that the court does retain a 
discretion to refuse relief where the landlord (and any other interested parties) cannot be put 
back into their original position. In Stanhope v Haworth (1866) 3 T.L.R. 34, for example, the 
tenant’s application for relief (which was made towards the end of the period of six months 
allowed by s.210 of the 1852 Act) was rejected on the ground that the landlord had so altered 
his position in the meantime that it would be inequitable to grant relief. In particular, the 
landlord had relet the premises (a colliery) to a third party who, in turn, had laid out substantial 
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sums in purchasing plant to work it: see also, Newbolt v Bingham (1895) 72 T.L.R. 852, 853, 
per Lord Esher M.R.  Similarly, in Silverman v AFCO (UK) Ltd [1988] 1 E.G.L.R. 51, the 
tenants had made a last minute application for relief following an assurance that they would 
not contest the landlord’s proceedings for possession. The landlords had, on the basis of this 
assurance and an order for possession which had not been defended by the tenants, executed a 
new lease of the premises to a third party. The Court of Appeal held that relief should be refused 
on the ground that the position of the parties had altered and the right of a third party had 
intervened. In these circumstances, the grant of relief would have caused obvious prejudice and 
injustice to the landlords. 
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